

# **New Survey on Antisemitic Attitudes in the U.S. Around the Start of the Iran War – Some Key Findings**

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March 21, 2026


This document provides a high-level summary of key findings from a new survey on antisemitic attitudes in the U.S. While the survey was primarily designed to investigate how people respond to different *claims* of antisemitism (i.e., with experimental message testing), it also provides useful insights into how antisemitic attitudes vary across the political spectrum and how they can shift in response to major geopolitical events. In particular, the survey was conducted during the onset of U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict in late February 2026, allowing us to examine how the initiation of a major war by the U.S. and Israel affected antisemitic views at home.

The key findings on these fronts include:

- **Antisemitic attitudes aren't monopolized by a single ideological camp.**

Some of the best survey evidence we have had in recent years highlights the political right – especially the far right – as the epicenter of antisemitic attitudes in America. In particular, a widely circulated study by Hersh and Royden (2023) asking about perceptions of Jewish power, dual loyalty, and collective blame for Israel shows a marked concentration on the right side of the political spectrum, particularly among “alt-right” young Americans.


Using the same questions, this survey in early 2026 suggests that the ideological landscape may have shifted. While the balance of antisemitic attitudes still tilts right overall, elevated agreement with antisemitic statements also appears on parts of the far left – yielding a more horseshoe-shaped distribution than prior studies as a result. Moreover, different antisemitic views emerge on each side of the political spectrum, with the far-right showing the highest agreement with Jewish power (slightly) and dual loyalty (especially) ideas, and the far-left showing the greatest susceptibility to collective blame attributions for Israel.



- **The onset of war is associated with measurable shifts in attitudes**

That said, a key finding here is that the start of the war with Iran led to a noticeable uptick in antisemitic attitudes, especially on the far left of the political spectrum. This shows how

antisemitism responds to and can be shaped by geopolitical events. It also underscores the fact that, prior to the war, the distribution looked significantly closer to (though still not *as* right-leaning as) the one found by Hersh and Royden. Is the uptick on the far left durable, or a temporary wartime phenomenon likely to recede? This remains a key question moving forward. Ultimately, this reminds us that antisemitism is a dynamic phenomenon, one that responds to political context.



- **Other demographic factors also matter.**

While this write-up focuses on ideological and event-driven influences, other factors also “pop” in preliminary analyses. Notably, antisemitic views are substantially higher among men and younger respondents, and they vary significantly along ethnic, racial, and religious

dimensions as well. The male and youth effects here are particularly powerful – reminding us that while political ideology is an important factor, it is not the only nor even necessarily the most important and potent one.

## **Methods**

### **Data and design.**

These results are based on an original online public opinion survey of U.S. adults conducted from February 20-March 5, 2026. The survey was conducted via Lucid/Cint theorem, a popular online research marketplace that draws from other survey panels for respondents. The audience targeted was a nationally representative quota-based sample, although in practice the survey should not be seen as nationally representative but as having broad functional representation across U.S. society. Because the survey fielding spans the onset of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, responses collected before and after the start of the conflict could be compared to estimate its impact.

### **Measures and analysis.**

Antisemitic attitudes were measured using three standard items that capture beliefs about Jewish power, dual loyalties, and collective blame – the same three items as in Hersh and Royden (2023).

Specifically, the wording of the three items was:

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Jews in the United States have too much power"
- Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States"

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is appropriate for opponents of Israel's policies and actions to boycott Jewish American owned businesses in their communities."

One subtle point to note is that, in this survey, the questions were asked with five-category response scales with a "neither agree nor disagree" middle category, whereas in Hersh and Royden (2023) and related ADL research they have been asked with four-category scales with no middle option. This should be taken into account when trying to compare the levels of antisemitic agreement here vs. in those other sources. Few studies have asked these exact questions with five-category scales – one that did so was a study by the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) lab at the University of Chicago working with the ADL in spring 2023 (ADL-CPOST 2023). In that study, the authors found only 8% agreement with the Jewish power trope (p. 21). Here I find 18%. While the surveys are quite different, that points toward a significant rise in recent years.

The results presented here are based on descriptive comparisons and regression models estimating the relationship between political ideology and antisemitic attitudes, as well as the effect of being surveyed after the onset of the war with standard demographic controls.

### **Work Cited:**

Hersh, Eitan, and Laura Royden. 2023. "Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Political Spectrum."

*Political Research Quarterly* 76(2): 697-711.

ADL-CPOST. 2023. "Antisemitism and Support for Political Violence." *Online research report*.

Available at <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2023-10/CPOST-Antisemitism-and-Support-for-Political-Violence.pdf>