Book Project:

Seeing is Disbelieving: Why People Believe Misinformation in War, and When They Know Better

Abstract: From Syria to Ukraine, misinformation, lies, and “fake news” are an endemic part of modern war. But when are they actually believed by the populations who live in conflict zones, and when are they not? This question is critical, as the spread of misinformation can initiate, exacerbate, and extend violent conflict. In this book, I build a new and surprising argument about false beliefs in war: that they depend on people’s exposure and proximity to the relevant events. While war is full of lies, those close enough to the “action” have the means and the motives to see through them. In short, when it comes to wartime misinformation, seeing is disbelieving. Focusing on recent conflicts in Pakistan and Iraq as well as historical evidence from WWII, I support this argument with surveys and experiments, a range of violent event data, and the pairing of the two in new and powerful ways. Ultimately, the results enhances our understanding of misinformation and propaganda in war, the psychology and behavior of civilian populations, the quality and accuracy of information emanating from warzones, and the role of facts and lies in contemporary world politics.

Published Work:

Silverman, Daniel, Benjamin Acosta, and Reyko Huang. “Rebel Leader Age and the Outcomes of Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, OnlineFirst. Link.

Abstract: What determines the outcomes of civil wars? Existing literature highlights numerous factors at the systemic, state, and organizational levels of analysis. Yet there is little research on the attributes of rebel leaders in shaping war outcomes despite ample theories of their importance in steering their organizations. This article focuses on rebel leaders’ age as one key driver of their behavior. Applying insights from developmental psychology to the context of armed rebellion, we argue that young rebel leaders are the most likely to suffer military defeats, middle-aged leaders to win military victories, and elderly ones to reach negotiated settlements. We use a mixed-methods strategy to substantiate our claims, combining case studies of George Washington and Yasser Arafat with new data from the Rebel Organization Leaders (ROLE) database. Our findings help advance the study of non-state violent leaders in world politics while illuminating neglected sources of risk and opportunity for peace practitioners.

Acosta, Benjamin, Reyko Huang, and Daniel Silverman. Introducing ROLE: A Database of Rebel Leader Attributes in Armed Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 60(2): 352-61. Link. Manuscript. Appendix. Codebook.

Abstract: Existing literature on civil wars relies predominantly on state- and organization-level variables to understand conflict dynamics and outcomes. In this article, we propose that rebel leaders’ personal backgrounds and experiences are also key to explaining the behavior of the organizations they lead. Just as scholars have long highlighted the importance of state leaders’ biographical characteristics in interstate war and diplomacy, we argue that the attributes of rebel leaders affect their organizations’ decisions and actions in civil war. To substantiate our claims, we introduce the Rebel Organization Leaders (ROLE) Database, which contains a wide range of biographical information on all top rebel leaders in civil wars ongoing between 1980 and 2011. We first describe the contents of the database and present a number of novel descriptive findings about rebel leaders. To illustrate its utility, we then examine the influence of rebel leaders’ attributes on their organizations’ use of terrorism in civil war. Ultimately, our work encourages—and enables—a new research agenda that goes beyond rebel organizations and campaigns as units of analysis and brings individual leaders more fully into modern conflict and peace studies.

Huang, Reyko, Daniel Silverman, and Benjamin Acosta. Friends in the Profession: Rebel Leaders, International Social Networks, and External Support for Rebellion. International Studies Quarterly, 66(1): sqab085. Link. Manuscript. Appendix.

Abstract: What drives foreign state support for rebel organizations? While scholars have examined the geopolitical and organizational factors that fuel foreign support, the role of rebel leaders in this process remains under-studied. In this article, we propose that rebel leaders’ personal backgrounds shape their ability to obtain foreign support during conflict. In particular, we argue that rebel leaders with significant prior international experiences – including study abroad, work abroad, military training abroad, and exile – are at an advantage in securing wartime external support for their organizations. These experiences provide opportunities for would-be rebel leaders to interact with a multitude of foreign individuals who may later enter politics or otherwise gain prominence in their respective societies, allowing them to build interpersonal social networks across borders. Such networks offer key points of contact when rebel leaders later seek foreign backing. We test this theory using data from the new Rebel Organization Leaders (ROLE) database, finding robust support for our argument as well as the broader role of rebel leader attributes in explaining external support. Our results underscore the value of incorporating individual leaders and their social networks more squarely into the study of modern war.

Silverman, Daniel, Daniel Kent, and Christopher Gelpi. Putting Terror in its Place: An Experiment on Mitigating Fears of Terrorism Among the American Public. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(2): 191-216. Link. Link to PAP. Manuscript. Appendix.

Abstract: An American’s yearly chance of being killed by a terrorist attack sits at roughly 1 in 3.5 million. Yet, over 40% of the American public consistently believes that they or their family members are likely to be the victim of a terror attack. Can these inflated estimates of the risks of terrorism be brought closer to reality? With trillions of dollars spent on the “War on Terror,” this question is not just theoretically but practically important. In order to investigate, we use an experimental approach assessing whether people update their core beliefs about the terror threat when given factual information about the risks it actually presents. We find that American public fear of terrorism as well as demand for countering it can be sharply reduced with better information, dropping essentially to pre-9/11 levels after receiving the treatments and staying that way two weeks later. These results show that the American public’s exaggerated fear of terrorism – which has facilitated many of the country’s costly foreign policy decisions since 9/11 – is far more malleable and correctible than previously thought. In this sense, countering terrorism may largely require providing more context and perspective.

Silverman, Daniel, Karl Kaltenthaler, and Munqith Dagher. 2021. “Seeing is Disbelieving: The Depths and Limits of Factual Misinformation in War.” International Studies Quarterly 65(3): 798-810. Link. Manuscript. Appendix.

Abstract: Misinformation, lies, and fake news are pervasive in war. But when are they actually believed by the people who live in warzones, and when are they not? This question is key, as their spread can spark greater violence and spoil efforts to make peace. In this study, we advance a new argument about lies in war. Building on existing research which links people’s factual beliefs in conflict to their psychological and informational biases, we argue that they also hinge on their exposure and proximity to relevant events. While war is rife with lies, those close to the action have the means and the motives to see through them. We test this argument with a unique combination of survey and event data from the Coalition air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in contemporary Iraq, finding support for our theory. Ultimately, the results help enhance our understanding of the dynamics of modern armed conflict and the reach of misinformation in contemporary world politics.

Silverman, Daniel. 2020. “Too Late to Apologize? Collateral Damage, Post-Harm Compensation, and Insurgent Violence in Iraq.” International Organization 74(4): 853-871. Link. Manuscript. Appendix. CMOCs Data.

Abstract: A key piece of conventional wisdom among scholars of modern armed conflict is that collateral damage is often strategically quite costly in war. Yet most combatants already know this and take actions after mistakes – most prominently, the distribution of “condolence payments” to civilian victims – in order to mitigate these costs. Do these payments work? This question is important not only for policymakers but also for deeper theoretical debates about how civilians respond to combatant signals in war. In order to examine these issues, I use micro-level conflict event data on 4,046 condolence payments made by Coalition forces to civilian victims during the Iraq War from 2004 to 2008, matching it with corresponding data on collateral damage and insurgent violence. The results of this analysis reveal that post-harm compensation does significantly diminish local rates of insurgent violence, and that this is true across different types of payments (cash handouts or in-kind assistance). Ultimately, these patterns can be best explained by a rationalist mechanism in which civilians update their beliefs about violent events based on new information about combatants’ wartime intentions. The results thus provide a compelling strategic rationale for combatants to compensate their victims in war, and suggest that civilians are not blinded to new information about conflict dynamics by their preexisting biases.

Karl Kaltenthaler, Daniel Silverman, and Munqith Dagher. 2020. “Nationalism, Threat, and Support for External Intervention: Evidence from Iraq.” Security Studies 29(3): 549-573. Link. Online Appendix.

Abstract: What drives citizens’ attitudes toward external military intervention in a society experiencing an armed conflict? From colonial Algeria to contemporary Afghanistan, conventional wisdom holds that nationalism is a critical source of opposition and resistance to such intervention. In contrast, we argue that the impact of nationalism on views of external intervention hinges on the strategic context facing the target nation. When the country’s principal threat is from the intervener itself, nationalism will indeed reduce support for outside intervention. But when the threat comes from elsewhere, nationalism will actually boost support for external intervention in order to defeat it. In order to investigate these dynamics, we use public opinion data from a unique survey fielded across Iraq in 2016 that includes questions about the military interventions against ISIL by both the U.S.-led Coalition and Iran, as well as a potential military intervention by Russia. The results are broadly consistent with our argument, showing that unlike other factors such as sectarianism, nationalism pushes Iraqis to seek foreign military help from any quarter when it is deemed necessary for national survival.

Silverman, Daniel. 2018. “What Shapes Civilian Beliefs about Violent Events? Experimental Evidence from Pakistan.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(6): 1460-1487. Link. Online Appendix. Replication Materials.

Abstract: Why do civilians in warzones often hold widely divergent beliefs about what is happening in the fighting? While there is a burgeoning literature on the micro-dynamics of armed conflict, variation in civilians’ factual beliefs has received scant attention. Yet such beliefs are critical, as they form the basis for wartime opinion and action. I argue that – particularly for civilians outside the direct “line of fire” – this variation comes not chiefly from an event’s empirical nature, but from civilians’ prior political orientations in the dispute. In order to investigate these dynamics, I fielded a survey experiment in Pakistan in which I manipulated the features of a reported counterinsurgent air strike and then measured civilians’ ensuing beliefs about it. The results show that these beliefs are most driven by the perpetrator’s identity and civilians’ own preexisting attachments. While actual casualty levels matter too, these findings suggest that civilians’ beliefs about conflict events are often deeply biased in nature.

Kaltenthaler, Karl, Daniel Silverman, and Munqith Dagher. 2018. “Identity, Ideology, and Information: The Sources of Iraqi Public Support for ISIS.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41(10): 801-824. Link.

Abstract: This article explores the amount and sources of support for the Islamic State among Iraqis. We argue that, in addition to shared identity and ideology, a neglected factor in debates about support for Islamist militancy is the messaging and information that individuals receive about a given group. We test these arguments using regression analysis on public opinion data collected in Iraq in April 2015. The analyses largely support our contentions, showing that exposure to news coverage of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant substantially reduces support for the group, even among alienated Sunnis or ideological Islamists.

Isani, Mujtaba, and Daniel Silverman. 2016. “Foreign Policy Attitudes towards Islamic Actors: An Experimental Approach.” Political Research Quarterly 69(3): 571-582. Link. Online Appendix. Replication Materials.

Abstract: This article examines how Western foreign policy opinion reacts to the perceived Islamic character of foreign actors. Studies show that the target actor’s dominant religion is a key ingredient in foreign policy opinion: Western audiences react more hostilely to “Muslim” than “Christian” targets. Yet actors differ not only in which world religion they belong to, but also how that religion is politicized both by themselves and by others. We argue that Islam can be politicized in three major ways – via Islamic rhetoric, policies, and labels – that shape foreign policy attitudes. To examine our claims, we field a survey experiment in which we attach common Islamic rhetoric (“Allahu Akbar”), policies (“Shari’a law”), and/or labels (“Islamist”) to a foreign actor in the context of the Syrian civil conflict. We find that these cues strongly harm attitudes towards the actor, and the results vary widely by type. Indeed, the Shari’a policy cue does the most damage to attitudes, emotions, and preferences towards the actor. Moreover, the Islamic cues reinforce each other in fueling these fearful reactions, and are particularly potent on conservative citizens. These results paint a richer picture of how outgroup religious cues influence foreign policy attitudes.

Working Papers:

Ongoing projects on: attitudes toward peace and factual beliefs in Ukraine, public opinion about war and its legacy in post-WWII occupied Germany; the effects of conflict fears on political attitudes in Iraq; the drivers of public support for U.S. military withdrawals; and continued research on rebel leaders and their role in contemporary conflict.